wc_helmets (wc_helmets) wrote in unjust_phil,
wc_helmets
wc_helmets
unjust_phil

Ontological existence for God

When inquiring about ontology and being, if one is affirmative in ontological inquiry (the antithesis being "why study that stupid shit, man"), one must also have formulated an existence of God. To be logically consistent, this belief in "God" must also in some way lean toward the affirmative.

1) When being affirmative in the belief in being, in the belief that 'is' actually has a meaning to it, one belives in a concept which is somehow intrinsic to the object but never material. This belief can be described in numerous ways, but this is the essentials.

2) This definition of belief (edit: being, not belief) also fulfills the definition of 'God'.

It is logically inconsistent to take either belief only.

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"1)... one beliefs in a concept which..."

Should that read "one believes in a concept..."?
Also: "intrinsic", not "intrensic", for whatever it's worth.

What "definition of belief" is being given? I see no "definition"; I see a conditional statement about a certain type of belief.

Furthermore, you claim that "it is logically inconsistent to take either belief only," presumably referring to 1 and 2 as the "either belief" in this case. I disagree.

Should 1 constitute a "definition of belief" as 2 implies (and I do not think that it does, but I will assume so for the sake of argument), we are fully able to believe that 1 "also fulfills the definition of 'God'" without actually believing 1 to be true.
I will edit the post. Damn, a man's gotta proofread.
It's all good. You never notice your own mistakes, it seems.
(That's the general "you".)
Furthermore, it seems as if your argument for "God" here relies on the notion of immaterial or non-physical (I assume?) properties. How does the non-physicality of a predicate directly imply God? I'm not sure I follow, but I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt here and allow you to explain.
How does the non-physicality of a predicate directly imply God?

Bear in mind, this goes against many different conceptions of God, though the ideas of God as "One", "Above all", and Monad are all quite old and multicultural. If one only attributes this definition to God and leaves out the supernatural trappings, you get to a definition that fits the english word "is". When "is" is used in a statement, it's meant to give a property some sort of inherent quality that is nonmaterial.

Example: That is red = that object has an inherent quality that is nonmaterial I call red.

As opposed to thinking there are many different "is"'s to define each object, it seems more logical to think this word "is" covers a wide variety of objects, providing whatever inherent nonmaterial quality is necessary to the object in a statement.

God, being an iherent nonmaterial quality that fills all objects with meaning, fulfills virtually the same meaning as the word "is". Therefore, if I believe in the concept of is, I should logically also believe in "God".

Om Shanti Shanti
"When 'is' is used in a statement, it's meant to give a property some sort of inherent quality that is nonmaterial."

Did you mean "object" in place of "property"?

I think you need to define "nonmaterial" more precisely. Why is the predicate "red" nonmaterial? Colour can be described in terms of the physical properties of an object, so why is it "nonmaterial"? The materialist could claim that all experiences can be reduced to material effects - that a personality trait (for example) is only posited as an explanation for a series of physical events occuring (such as "doing things that seem to be smart" making a person "smart") but is itself not "real", in a way similar to the way Hume views causality. If everything at the ontological level is material, the concept "nonmaterial" doesn't mean much in this discussion.

If instead you are making the claim that "red" only exists in experience - that we do not see a certain wavelength of light, but instead have the nonmaterial "experience" of red - then the same can be said of any physical object: I do not "hold" the "rock" in my hand, I have the "experience" of "holding" something which I constitute as "a rock". Hence any "material/nonmaterial" distinction collapses and "nonmaterial" becomes a meaningless phrase. I'm not saying that's the route you're necessarily taking - just that if it is, it won't work.

"As opposed to thinking there are many different "is"'s to define each object, it seems more logical to think this word "is" covers a wide variety of objects, providing whatever inherent nonmaterial quality is necessary to the object in a statement."

The Heideggerian "being of beings"? Sure, we can claim that "being" is a property shared by all "beings", but I don't see how that gets us to God. Again, further explanation of "nonmaterial" is required.

Finally, you claim that God fills objects with meaning. The quality of being - the "is" - does not fill objects with meaning, it fills them with existence. Meaning and existence are two different things.

Also, God is a "quality"?
For sake of clarification, we'll go with object.

Why is the predicate "red" nonmaterial? Colour can be described in terms of the physical properties of an object, so why is it "nonmaterial"?

Ask somebody who has been blind all their life.

If instead you are making the claim that "red" only exists in experience hen the same can be said of any physical object

I'm trying to avoid that route due to the infinite regress you describe. Obviously, there are objects independent of our experience that exist. However, any conception we have of these objects will be filtered. I don't think that stance creates meaningless phrases, though.

The Heideggerian "being of beings"? Sure, we can claim that "being" is a property shared by all "beings", but I don't see how that gets us to God.

Because that is exactly the definition of God I'm trying to ascribe. It's like if you take a set of all the definitions of God and a set of all the definitions of being, there will be an overlap in certain areas (for example, being as a property that gives an object existence.)

The quality of being - the "is" - does not fill objects with meaning, it fills them with existence.

True, my bad on that one. But I don't think it changes my argument fundamentally.

Also, God is a "quality"?

Well, It certainly wouldn't be a quantity.




"Ask somebody who has been blind all their life."

Why should we expect someone who has been blind their whole life to be an expert on colour? I fail to see the sense in that approach. Perhaps you could answer the question yourself directly?

"God, being an iherent [sic] nonmaterial quality..."
"Well, [God] certainly wouldn't be a quantity."

...so, which is it then? You're contradicting yourself.


Your definition of "God" reduces the idea to being identical with "existence", and I think that's reducing the concept of "God" so much that it is no longer "God" in a meaningful way. The fact that things exist on its own does not imply anything about the creation, meaning, or purpose of said things. Most interpretations of God with which I am aware posit God as the creator of existence, as the one who bestows meaning or purpose on existence, or as an omnipotent, perfect force. Raw being is none of those things.
Why should we expect someone who has been blind their whole life to be an expert on colour?

Because they share a conception of color with the rest of us. The predicate red is nonmaterial because it is not a thing-in-itself. Red is predicated by our societal conceptualization of red as a color.

You're contradicting yourself.

I don't see how not equating God with a quanity as opposed to equating God with a quality is a contradiction.

Your definition of "God" reduces the idea to being identical with "existence", and I think that's reducing the concept of "God" so much that it is no longer "God" in a meaningful way.

I suppose that's what part of this fallacious argument on my part is all about. I'm trying not to equate being/existence with God, but I'm trying to tread the line by thinking of God starting with existence and building up. Many of the things Heidegger said about Da Sein are the same things Dinoysius the Areopagiete said about God, so exploring the ground in between seems fruitful.

Most interpretations of God with which I am aware posit God as the creator of existence, as the one who bestows meaning or purpose on existence, or as an omnipotent, perfect force. Raw being is none of those things.

True, but these theories start with God as perfect being, or even nonbeing, emanating the rest. However, raw being and perfect are two different concepts. Hmmm.....

"Because they share a conception of color with the rest of us."

I'd be curious to see how you hope to prove that one. I've never tasted whiskey in my life, but I have a conception of how it might taste. Is my conception shared with people who have in fact tasted it? Should I be considered a reliable source on the taste of whiskey, despite never having experienced it?

"I don't see how not equating God with a quanity as opposed to equating God with a quality is a contradiction."

Sorry, misread that, or subconsciously assumed that you had made another typo, since it's very obviously a false dilemma to suggest that if something is not a "quantity", it must be a "quality". Most objects are neither quantities nor qualities, though they bear these properties. Why is God not such an object?

"I'm trying to tread the line by thinking of God starting with existence and building up."

Then what you seem to be doing is positing God alongside the aforementioned "is". This assumes God along with the "is" and does nothing to prove or logically deduce God from "is".
The definition of God includes the quality of being. Fine, so does the definition of every other object. Definition by itself doesn't initiate existence.
Do all objects not exist?